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Critical Innovations in the UK Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and Equity Alternative Finance 
Markets for Small Firm Growth 
Abstract: This paper examines the disruptive nature of financial innovations available to 
small firms by the growing range of online platforms that have emerged in the UK since the 
financial crisis. It is shown that finance provided to small firms via such mechanisms is not 
the same as more traditional sources and its adoption therefore cannot be said to be simply a 
question of direct substitution based, for example, on a price comparison. The platforms offer 
a series of important advantages over more traditional sources of early-stage capital for 
entrepreneurs seeking funding.  Service innovations around security, flexibility of terms, 
speed of access and transparency of pricing are as important as price considerations for 
many users, as are innovations made possible by the way these online markets are structured 
and in particular in the way these innovative structures allow important types of risk to be 
dispersed and mitigated. 
Keywords: innovation; crowdfunding; P2P lending; alternative finance; business growth. 
Introduction 
Alternative forms of finance have revolutionised traditional banking and equity finance for 
early stage growth firms, and have gained momentum rapidly in the last 3 years (Baeck et al, 
2014). It has become an acknowledged way for start-up firms to raise equity finance in sums, 
too small to be efficient for traditional forms of Venture Capital; and an easy accessible tool 
for small firms seeking debt finance (Bank of England, 2015).  
In this paper the authors consider a significant part of Alternative Finance, represented 
by crowdfunding online platforms. The phenomenon has caught the attention of 
entrepreneurial finance researchers, where certain definitions have been developed 
(Hildebrand et al, 2013), a classification has been proposed to distinguish among different 
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forms of crowdfunding (Ahlers et al, 2012; Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Griffin, 2012; Zhang and 
Liu, 2012), and some campaign success factors have been investigated (Colombo et al, 
2015).  However, consistent comparisons and in-depth analyses have been constrained by the 
lack of available data, protected by their holders – crowdfunding organisations. As a result, a 
general understanding of the market remains descriptive and scattered. 
Unlike previous studies, this paper aims to take a consolidating stance at the 
macroeconomic level, where Alternative Finance (in part of online crowdfunding and peer-
to-peer lending) is viewed as a new institution, which by means of certain competitive 
advantages augments existing formal mechanisms of entrepreneurial finance and helps 
facilitate start-up and small firm growth (Wright et al, 2015). The objective of the research is 
to identify and summarise key structural innovations in the online crowdfunding and peer-to-
peer lending, which drive the ongoing transformations in the entrepreneurial finance market, 
replacing traditional venture capital and bank lending. Our contribution lies in forming a 
theoretical foundation in line with the collected empirical facts, addressing the impact of 
online crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending on the overall finance market available to 
support small firms’ growth.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: first, a theoretical background of 
crowdfunding as a disruptive innovation and new market will be developed, second, the 
empirical evidence will be outlined to underpin the propositions: separately for peer-to-peer 
lending, and equity crowdfunding, and finally, conclusions and implication drawn from the 
analysis will follow the discussion of the results. 
Research in Crowdfunding: Overview 
The Alternative Finance is a relatively new phenomenon and, as such, not only is there 
a paucity in related literature, no one universally accepted definition has emerged. For the 
purposes of this study we adopt a working definition of Alternative Finance, as a range of 
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new financial instruments arising in the market and available to seed ventures, characterised 
by three common features: quick diffusion, platform-mediated approaches, and the use social 
networks to harness communities (Bruton et al, 2015). These financial innovations mainly 
include: microfinance, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer lending, and community funding (Fraser 
et al, 2015). 
According to Belleflamme et al (2010; 2014) and Mollick (2014), the ‘crowdfunding’ 
activities involve an open call, mostly through the Internet, for the provision of financial 
resources either in form of donation or in exchange for the future product or some form of 
reward (including equity) to support initiatives for specific purposes. Peer-to-peer lending (or 
P2P) - a tool for providing micro-loans is often considered separately from crowdfunding, 
although adopting the same business model (Herzenstein et al, 2010; Lin et al, 2013; 
Komarova Loureiro and Gonzalez, 2014). These two forms of Alternative Finance represent 
the core object of the study, and can be easily compared with bootstrap finance, which 
favours the use of internal funds as opposed to external providers such as, angel investors or 
bank loans (Bhide, 1991; Sarasvathy, 2001; Winborg, J., 2015). Belleflamme et al (2014) 
have also looked at crowdfunding through a lens of ‘pre-ordering and price discrimination’, 
and supporting the earlier work of Nocke et al (2011) linked product pre-ordering to price 
discrimination in a context of information asymmetry.  
However, while parallels have been drawn with other sources of entrepreneurial finance 
in order to gain a better understanding of crowdfunding (Ebben and Johnson, 2006; Winborg 
and Landstrom, 2001), few papers have considered it from an innovation perspective. At the 
same time, the innovative nature of the crowdfunding (and P2P) business model thrives on 
the technological progress of online transactions, and seems to be the core pillar of the 
phenomenon (Davis, 2012).  
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New Market Formation: Innovations in the Entrepreneurial Finance Market 
The innovation-decision process as a series of steps from awareness to adoption has 
become an important topic for sociologists and business practitioners (Kaur Kapoor et al, 
2014; Rogers et al, 2005). From an economic perspective, the incentive to innovate is the 
difference in profit that a firm can earn if it invests in research and development compared to 
what it would earn if it did not invest (Gilbert, 2006). The limitations of such an approach 
underestimate innovation as a coupling and matching process, where interaction is the critical 
element (Tidd, 2006). 
Over the past fifteen years, interest has shifted from the diffusion and adoption of 
innovation(s) per se, towards understanding how incumbent firms respond to change when 
the innovation threatens its current modus operandi. This shift has acknowledged a process in 
which innovation occurs as complex and often chaotic (Christensen, 1997). In addition to the 
threats to innovation within an organisation (Christensen, 2002), there are those posed by 
changes in the market. A small threat, often referred to as, steady-state innovation, will see a 
firm responding to innovative activity in product and process terms, along the lines of ‘doing 
what we do, but better’ (Bessanet et al, 2005). A significant threat is one that creates a 
discrete and momentous change for the incumbent firm, or its value chain. In this case, when 
conditions move beyond a steady-state in terms of technology, market or some other 
dimension it can lead to a period of creative destruction, whereby old regimes are destroyed 
in order that resources are freed up for new (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Schumpeter, 
1942). Stemming from this perspective, crowdfunding and P2P lending can be viewed as a 
new market, potentially initiating creative destruction in the entrepreneurial finance market, 
forcing incumbent institutional organisations, and professional private investors either to 
change to be able to compete, or give up traditional forms of formal finance: 
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Proposition 1: Crowdfunding and P2P platforms represent a business model innovation, 
which gives rise to a new market emergence that will result in creative destruction of 
traditional forms of formal entrepreneurial funding. 
Linked with an interest in how incumbent firms respond to the Schumpeterian notion of 
creative destruction is a concern that while innovations can be disruptive to incumbents, 
treating them as a homogenous group has in fact complicated, not clarified, a complex issue. 
In its original guise, Christensen’s (1997) model considered technological innovation from 
the perspective of how new technologies came to surpass seemingly superior technologies in 
a market. The disruptiveness of innovations (which characterises the ability of an 
organisation to surpass the existing technology, product, or service) is described in the 
literature as a continuous variable, comprising such features as lower price, improved 
performance, and being appealed to the ‘low-end’ market, represented by the more price-
sensitive customer segment (Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006a). This could be directly 
applied to the crowdfunding and P2P market, mainly addressing start-ups as the low-end 
customer segment, seeking for the cheap, accessible and unburdening finance. These 
financial innovations can be view as an outcome of a technological opportunism (Srinivasan 
et al, 2002), allowed them to compete with the traditional finance providers in the same 
niche: business angels (along with other forms of venture capital), and banks: 
Proposition 2: Crowdfunding and P2P platforms outperformed low-end competition, and 
gained customers (small businesses) loyalty, resulting in their rapid dissemination and growth 
rates. 
In his further developments Christensen and Raynor (2003) pointed that over time, 
users require less from the original product than offered with each product cycle 
enhancement. A disruptive technological innovation results in the addition of a new 
technological curve, offering inferior attributes and performance than existing technology. 
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Christensen coined the terms, ‘low-end’ or ‘new market’ disruptions to describe the change. 
Low-end disruptive technology focuses on the needs of the low end of the market, however, 
over time, as technology improves, it is able to compete with the mainstream technology and 
competes at the high end of the market as well. Assuming that high-end market is represented 
by early-adopters, who are least prices sensitive, the dynamics on the crowdfunding and P2P 
lending market demonstrates the signs of a radical innovation (Rogers, 2003), by conquering 
new niches, targeting more advanced businesses, or companies at the later stages of their 
development. Currently these platforms have proved that they perform well on the low-end 
market (targeting low-margin start-ups), and started reaching more sophisticated businesses, 
maintaining the same dimensions of value (Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006b): 
Proposition 3: Crowdfunding and P2P lending platforms are currently in the position of 
‘high-end’ competition, where new entrants are joining the market, offering new 
modifications and alternatives.  
Christensen and Raynor (2003) went on to advocate that, customers impose a great 
indirect control of the resource allocation process inside a company; this was fundamental to 
understanding why established firms encounter problems under conditions of discontinuous 
change. This refinement actually, embraces work previously undertaken by Henderson and 
Clark (1990) along with Tushman and Anderson (1986) who attributed failure to a firm’s 
inability to renew its resources, structures and capabilities. Later still, Christensen widened its 
application to embrace products and business models, arguing that together, they strengthen 
the notion that incumbent firms encounter most problems when trying to engage with 
discontinuous innovations (Culkin et al, 2006). A firm may possess sufficient competencies 
to manage its way through fluctuations in the market, but when technologies or business 
models change, new markets emerge or the regulatory frameworks of an industry are altered, 
they find it hard to adapt to these shifts (Sandstrom and Osborne, 2011).  
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Proposition 4: Crowdfunding and P2P lending represents a market of discontinuous 
innovations, leaving traditional banking and equity markets in a disadvantaged position. 
As a result, the traditional market of entrepreneurial finance has not only faced the adverse 
effects of macroeconomic changes, but has also been exposed to the structural changes in the 
economy in recent years, imposing certain implications for their future functioning: 
Proposition 5: The emergence of a new crowdfunding and P2P lending market causes 
structural fluctuations in the economy, thus defining a new context for the existing 
institutions.  
In the rest of the paper empirical evidence will be provided to reinforce the propositions 
– the threats, which is what we argue online crowdfunding platforms most closely resemble 
and how incumbents, entrepreneurs and other actors (e.g. Government Agencies) respond. 
This paper does not examine the separate but related phenomenon of donation-based 
crowdfunding (Kromidha, 2014; Mitra, 2014). The major donation-based crowdfunding sites 
including Kickstarter and Indidgogo are based in the US, although they have been used by 
some UK-based small businesses seeking funding for creative projects or product launches.  
Method 
Research on crowdfunding remains scattered and partial, mainly restrained by the 
limited access to the information, especially on the side of capital providers. An inductive 
research approach (Locker, 2007) was employed to develop insights into the way in which 
key stakeholders construct their world of work. In this paper the detailed readings of raw data 
were used to identify the elements of structural innovations, develop a structural model of a 
new market of alternative finance for small businesses, provide a summary of its the key 
characteristics, and clearly distinguish it from the traditional lending and investing 
mechanisms. 
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The primary material for the paper was gathered via unstructured interviews over a 
period of 2012-2015 with the founders of eight leading P2P lending and equity crowdfunding 
platforms in the UK (see table 1), representing 90% of the equity finance market in 2014 
(AltFi, 2014).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Our material was supplemented by a systematic review of the media coverage and 
specialist commentary on the developing P2P sector over the same period; as well as 
obtaining insights through interviews and private discussions with senior representatives in 
such organisations as the British Business Bank, the Financial Conduct Authority, the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Treasury, the ACCA and KPMG (Davis, 
2012). In addition, information is drawn from founders and early-stage senior staff at the 
individual platforms, which in themselves represent the key actors in each of the major 
product area - SME short-term lending, SME invoice finance, and equity – and dominate the 
market (AltFi, 2014). 
Developments in Online Platforms 
Crowdfunding and P2P lending by means of certain competitive advantages tend to 
occupy the low-end position in the market, represented by the small businesses looking for 
modest sums to get their venture started at minimum costs within a relatively short period of 
time. The evidence suggests that P2P and Crowdfunding services for small firms are in the 
midst of a period of rapid growth that is bringing an alternative source of funding to smaller 
British companies – at current rates, it is possible that, the end of 2015, will have channelled 
some £1bn to small companies. Over the past few years these competitive advantages, often 
referred to in the literature (Mollick and Robb, 2016), have been systematically shaped into 
structural innovations. The latter have given rise to a new market, attracting more advanced 
‘high-end’ firms, who are ready to switch from traditional funders (see fig.1). 
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Figure 1 The innovation cycle in the equity and lending markets for small businesses 
As a result, crowdfunding and P2P lending as a rapidly developing form of alternative 
finance reveal to be a new growing market. The pattern of this growth, and its antecedents 
will be considered separately in relations to P2P lending and equity crowdfunding.  
Small Business Lending 
To date, the development of the P2P and Crowdfunding market for small businesses in the 
UK has followed a clear pattern. Modest loans to smaller companies is the main attribute of 
P2P lending market, where the mean amount lent through Funding Circle was £2,000 
(Pierrakis and Collins, 2013). These businesses therefore sit at the smaller end of the SME 
spectrum and, given their size and riskiness compared with the cost of assessing their 
creditworthiness, we would argue they are the least likely to provide significantly profitable 
lending opportunities for banks. The only caveat is unless they buy other products and 
services from the same bank, thereby producing a profit on a “product portfolio” basis. They 
are also the least likely to have significant assets with which to back their borrowing. 
The P2P lending platforms can therefore be said to occupy the bottom up market, 
concentrating their efforts on building a strong base of borrowers among smaller companies 
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that require relatively modest loans and represent the least attractive combination of risk and 
return for conventional lenders. 
In the case of platforms specialising in business lending and in particular the dominant 
platform, Funding Circle, it is clear that the popularity of the service can be attributed to a 
series of factors, of which cost of capital to the borrower is not necessarily the most 
important. Instead, previous research indicates that the speed with which applications to post 
a loan request on the platform are decided is critical in entrepreneurial choice of funding 
source (Pierrakis and Collins, 2014). Low fixed costs enable the platforms to trade on a mix 
of their arrangement fees plus a spread of just 1% (at least 2% for banks) between the rates 
charged to borrowers and the rates paid to lenders (Baeck et al, 2014). In Table 2 below, we 
summarise the main factors, which have shaped entrepreneurial choice towards P2P lending 
in accordance with the Innovation Circle outlined above. 
Insert Error! Reference source not found. about here 
This analysis suggests that P2P lending represents a potential threat to the formal 
banking sector, where more favourable conditions, increased processing speed, and a more 
effective communication interface attract more and more entrepreneurs – a fact which lies in 
the basis of crowdfunding as a potential source of creative destruction (proposition 1). 
Platforms managed to establish the niche in the broader funding market, where a number of 
the factors that help to ensure their popularity with borrowers also contribute to their ability 
to establish their market position in relation to other lenders, in particular. Thus P2P 
platforms open up a market niche at the lower end of the loan market that banks are not keen 
to compete in (proposition 2). 
The leading SME lending platforms have been responsible for introducing a series of 
structural innovations as a result of the ‘high-end’ competition. They can mostly be referred 
to the business-model innovations that did not exist in the same form before the emergence of 
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these online “loan-matching” services and that bring genuinely new benefits to SME that use 
these markets. These innovations have been achieved as an outcome of competition among 
the platforms as well, providing an example to illustrate proposition 3. From the other side, 
better, cheaper, and faster services of P2P lending have increased the distance from 
traditional credit institutions who now face discontinuous innovations with which they are  
challenges to keep up (proposition 4). 
The period of turmoil in conventional financing markets led to a temporary 
retrenchment among the UK’s leading high-street banks, which between them account for 
more than 90% of term lending to Britain’s small businesses (Financial Conduct Authority, 
2014), and created the conditions in which alternative finance providers were able to gain a 
foothold among business borrowers, no longer able or willing to use bank finance. The early 
innovators in P2P and Crowdfunding for small businesses were established in the years 
immediately after the financial crisis  - a tendency, reinforcing proposition 5. 
Since the financial crisis, approval rates on bank overdraft facilities, particularly by 
first-time applicants, have declined somewhat and charges for undrawn overdraft facilities 
have increased, making this a less attractive way for businesses to fund their working capital 
needs (SME Finance Monitor, 2015). The service that the online invoice discounting 
platforms provides to small firms has gained popularity with companies that use it by 
overcoming most, in some cases, implying collaboration between traditional and alternative 
finance providers (for example, Santander and Funding Circle) if not all, of these criticisms, 
thus gaining momentum both for the sake of financial crisis, and structural innovations 
(proposition 5).  
Equity Crowdfunding 
Online equity crowdfunding in the UK has developed rapidly over the past three years and 
now follows several models that have slightly different features but all of which enable retail 
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investors to access marketplaces in which they can buy shares in early-stage, private 
businesses. For entrepreneurs seeking to raise early-stage risk capital to fund their enterprises, 
these platforms are opening up a significant new source of finance that it was previously 
impossible for them to access because of regulatory restrictions on the marketing to retail 
investors of opportunities to invest in equity offerings. However, since the Financial Conduct 
Authority regulates the new online intermediaries, they have the necessary regulatory 
clearances to promote these investments to retail investors and therefore raise funds from this 
source. 
The popularity of equity crowdfunding for entrepreneurs is based on several factors (see 
table 3), not all of which apply to all platforms, but which illustrate the process of 
overcoming more severe ‘low-end competition’, than in P2P case (proposition 2).  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Equity crowdfunding has been able to establish a niche in the market for early-stage 
investments primarily by altering the “terms of trade” broadly in favour of the entrepreneur 
and the smaller retail investor by the means outlined above (a statement in support of 
proposition 3). The growth of the various equity platforms demonstrates a clear appetite 
exists among the British public, to invest in start-up and early-stage companies and that once 
deals can be offered at minimum investment commitments of a few pounds, thousands of 
people are able and willing to participate. This is widening the universe of early-stage equity 
investments significantly and may ultimately result both in more early-stage propositions 
receiving equity funding than would have happened previously and in greater competition to 
fund the most promising opportunities. Over time it is possible that the attractions for 
entrepreneurs of raising early-stage finance by this route will start to divert “deal-flow” that 
would previously have gone to other sources of “angel funding” and that the platforms will 
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therefore also start to attract large numbers of traditional angel investors in search of the most 
attractive businesses (propositions 4 and 5). 
A similar pattern has emerged in equity crowdfunding. Companies selling shares via 
these platforms are typically trying to raise sums of less than £250,000 and in the case of very 
early-stage companies most are seeking £50,000 to £100,000. Again, these transactions 
represent low-value/high-risk propositions (although at the upper end £250,000 represents a 
significant angel investment if not syndicated to a group) and are the most likely to appear 
financially unattractive to traditional angel investors if the full costs of conventional legal, 
commercial and financial due diligence have to be factored into the equation (Mason and 
Harrison, 2015; Mason and Stark, 2004; Maxwell et al, 2011).  
As a consequence, and following on from the ideas of Christensen (1997), the online 
crowdfunding platforms are currently occupying a segment of the market where incumbent 
providers of finance find it least attractive to operate. The parameters of the market, can be 
defined as follows: 
1. Concentration on unsecured lending to smaller businesses  
2. The dominance of individual retail investors  
3. Reduced fixed costs due to the absence of the branch networks 
Discussion 
There are several avenues for further research, suggested by our analysis. In the models 
operated by platforms, such as Crowdcube and Seedrs, the process of raising equity via a 
public online marketplace enables the entrepreneurs to use the support of “friends and 
family” – those who would be likely to invest in their business anyway, for non-financial as 
much as for financial reasons – in order to garner support from a much broader “crowd” of 
potential investors who are not known to them personally. The ability that the platform 
provides to bring together personal networks with the crowd enables the entrepreneur to 
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harness the “psychology of the crowd” in order to amplify the value of the support they 
derive from “friends and family” or from angel investors willing to fund part of their target 
amount3. Anecdotal evidence provided by the staff of the platforms indicates that not only are 
non-family and friends investors more inclined to back fundraisings that have already 
attracted funds than those registering zero, but also that they are more likely to back 
campaigns that have large numbers of existing backers than those that have only one or two, 
even if those individuals have committed a large proportion of the target4. 
In addition, equity crowdfunding platforms also tap into other motivations among the 
investor community beyond the purely financial (Murnieks et al, 2015). These include social 
motivations connected with the desire to support a business that is local or known to the 
investor in question, and the desire among smaller investors to “take part in the journey” of 
that business as it grows and to feel a personal connection to the enterprise. By enabling 
people to commit very small sums to these companies, the platforms make possible a range of 
non-financial motives for investing that are likely to be as important to those individuals as 
financial ones. The whole area of investor motivations on crowdfunding platforms is one that 
is relatively unexplored and would repay further research. 
The research covers only selected platforms in the market, which represents one of its 
limitations. Moreover, more systematic data collection across the distinguished categories, 
characterising new market parameters, would enable the researchers to develop a robust 
methodology to validate the propositions. Incomparability of data across the platforms 
(mainly caused by the private nature of the information) posts another limitation for the 
consistent analysis. 
Conclusions  
The paper provides the first attempt to summarise the key structural innovations that online 
P2P lending and equity crowdfunding enable, and form a new market, centred upon the 
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provision of efficient, flexible and low-cost ways of bringing together large groups of funders 
to support relatively low-value transactions. The revealed tendencies fits into the 
Christensen’s model of structural innovations, and contribute to a better understanding of the 
new mechanisms emerged as a result of the on-going transformations. Considering 
crowdfunding as a form of structural innovation that follows a process of adoption, and have 
a potential to replace existing markets of entrepreneurial finance, certain characteristics of 
creative destruction can be identified. Based on the facts about recent developments in the 
crowdfunding market, five key threats to the traditional banking and equity infrastructure 
were identified. These threats illustrate a competitive environment, caused by both 
macroeconomic fluctuations and structural changes in the economy, imposing certain 
implications on creditors and investors, which are either to find the way to adapt (as 
illustrated above), or are condemned to the significant transformations. Backed up with the 
literature on innovation, the threats are framed into the following propositions, which 
characterise the recent tendencies.  First, that crowdfunding clearly represents a form of a 
disruptive innovation on the small firm financial market, which certainly overcame ‘low-end’ 
competition, and has become massively favoured by the customers-entrepreneurs. As a 
consequence, the competition reached a ‘high-end’, where a continuous process of innovation 
left incumbent credit and investment organisations (and even professional private investors – 
business-angels) at a disadvantage. In the context of the financial crisis, these structural 
changes are intensified, giving the space for new markets, and enhancing the fragility of the 
traditional financial channels for small businesses (McCollough et al, 2016).  
While the emergent market does not lack its own challenges and pitfalls, which have 
been briefly raised throughout the paper and in the discussion part, it seems to be a 
competitive contestant to the existing structures. Thus its impact on small firms’ growth and 
success are vital for further research, and urges the need for the consistent approaches and 
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robust estimations to be developed with the aim to systematically evaluate its scope, 
development, and the effectiveness of the integration with the business structures.  
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Notes 
1 Analysis by the authors suggest average loan size on Funding Circle, the largest of the P2P 
SME lenders by far, is approx. £60,000, while the average borrower has turnover of between 
£500,000 and £1.2m. 
2 https://www.fundingcircle.com/blog/2014/06/funding-circle-santander-announce-
partnership-support-thousands-uk-businesses/ 
3 See for example: http://blog.seedrs.com/2013/07/01/in-crowdfunding-momentum-is-king/ 
4 Based on remarks during a presentation by Tom Davies, chief investment officer of Seedrs, 
on June 3, 2014, at the CEEDR conference on SME funding, University of Middlesex 
Business School, June 3, 2014. 
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Table 1: Online platforms engaged in the study 
Platform Product First 
Transaction 
Total amount raised 
up to March 2016 
Funding Circle
  
Loans August 2010 £1162m 
ThinCats Loans October 2010 £156.7 
Funding Knight Loans 2012 £30.1m 
Crowdcube Equity July 2011 £145.2 
Seedrs Equity July 2012 £100m 
Syndicate Room Equity July 2011 £45.8m 
MarketInvoice Receivables Finance February 2011 £685.7m 
LendInvest Short-term Property 
Finance 
May 2013 £559.6m 
Table 2: P2P lending platforms – the evidence of new market formation 
Competitive 
advantages 
Structural Innovations Examples  
Cost of capital Reverse or Dutch auctions  Lenders bid against each other to advance funds to the borrower (Funding 
Circle) 
Borrowers are not penalised for early repayment (Funding Knight) 
Speed of the process Autobid functions (automatic bidding functions) The processing time is brought down to four working days (Funding Circle) 
Security 
 
Personal guarantee (does not include a charge on 
the directors’ personal assets) 
The opportunity to secure finance when a company’s assets are already 
pledged as collateral to other lenders (Funding Circle) 
Flexibility of terms  Fractionalised lending and secondary markets  Assembling loans from multiple individual offers to lend that can be traded in 
the secondary markets 
Transparency over 
fees 
Q&A forums Free and equal access to supplementary information on borrowers should help 
to improve the liquidity of the market on the lending side  
Additional benefits Online invoice auctions Enable small businesses to auction their trade receivables to groups of buyers 
in order to accelerate the receipt of funds tied up in unpaid invoices 
(MarketInvoice and Platform Black) 
Table 3: Equity crowdfunding - the evidence of new market formation 
Competitive advantages Structural Innovations Examples 
Control over price Demand-led deal origination mechanism Companies are allowed to set the financial terms of the transaction – the 
size and price of the offering (Crowdcube and Seedrs) 
Control over terms Demand-led deal origination mechanism Companies are allowed to determine the shareholder rights (Crowdcube) 
Decreased transaction costs Nominee structure The platform becomes the sole legal representative of the underlying 
group of shareholders in the company (Seedrs) 
Lack of formal Due Diligence Q&A forums Most equity crowdfunding rely on the “wisdom of the crowd  
Low minimum investment sizes Online administration procedures Minimum investments can be as little as £10 or £20 
Overfunding ‘All or nothing’ business model Companies are allowed to continue accepting offers to invest once they 
reach their initial funding target, provided that these additional shares are 
sold on the same terms as the initial tranche 
Advocacy Value co-creation Retail investors can also be well-placed to become early adopters of their 
product or service 
 
 
